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The new players in middle market mergers and acquisitions

What private equity takeover means for owner-operators.

[Photo: Getty Images]

Profile photo of Ron Smith

Founding Partner · Cordis Group

A founder running a heating, ventilation, and air conditioning business that generates $12 million in revenue called me 18 months before retiring to start the process of selling his business. He was certain the buyer would be the family-owned competitor 30 miles away that had been trying to buy his business for three years. He wasn’t expecting what would happen.

The buyer’s first formal bid arrived as a letter of intent, or LOI. My client learned the competitor he had trusted for 20 years was now part of a private equity platform. He realized he would not be negotiating with a known entity, but with a sophisticated team that had absorbed family-owned businesses this way many times before.

That call is the new normal in the lower middle market. Cherry Bekaert’s Private Equity 2025 Trends and 2026 Outlook finds 73% of all lower-middle-market transaction activity now goes to private equity add-ons.

In less than a decade, the buyer profile for lower-middle-market businesses has flipped. For owner-operators this means the buyer is increasingly an institution running a financial model rather than a neighbor who knows the business. That changes what the buyer cares about, how the company gets valued, and how a founder needs to prepare for the sale.

RESIDENTIAL TRADES FLIPPED THE FASTEST

Five years ago, the typical buyer for an HVAC, plumbing, or electrical business with $5 million to $15 million in revenue was a regional competitor with overlapping routes—someone who knew the routes, the technicians, and the customers by name. In the deals I see now, that same business sells to a PE-backed platform that has bought a dozen regional competitors in the last 24 months. The platform is now the regional competitor.

Over the last two years, I have watched this pattern in deal after deal. The biggest valuation adjustments rarely come from financial performance. They come from buyer-specific concerns the seller never prepared for and didn’t expect.

SAME NUMBERS, DIFFERENT VALUATIONS

Think about selling a home, for example. The same three-bedroom is a teardown to a developer, a starter house to a young family that values the fenced yard, and an accessibility problem to a retired couple who wants single-level living. You can spend nine months and $100,000 renovating the kitchen to help it sell. The developer never even bothers to open a cabinet. [RC1] [RS2] 

Consider this same scenario applied to a $12-million-revenue business with 35% customer concentration from three different buyer seats. A strategic acquirer in an adjacent market may pay a premium for that concentration. They understand that once those customers sit inside the strategic’s larger book, the concentration vanishes into diversification. A private equity add-on treats the same concentration as a discount line item. A family office, which invests a single wealthy family’s capital and plans to hold for the long term, is largely indifferent to it.

Nothing about the business changes. The revenue, the customers, the 35% concentration are identical for every buyer. What changes is the value each buyer assigns to them, and that gap can be worth millions on the final term sheet.

I have spent the last two years documenting this at Cordis Institute. Two papers published by SSRN—The Buyer Lane Preparation Map and The Preparation Gap in Early 2026—track what the data shows. Drawing on GF Data’s record of first half 2025 transactions, our analysis found that across roughly three-quarters of sub-$50 million transactions, post-LOI adjustments cut more than 15% off the deal price. The exact figure varies by industry. The directional shift is unmistakable.

On a $29.5 million LOI, for example, the founder who prepared for the standard playbook takes home $18 million at close. The founder who prepared for what the specific buyer actually leads with takes home $27 million. Same business. Same buyer. Same offer. The $9 million gap is the misalignment tax.

THE MOST DANGEROUS ADVICE IN THE MARKET

The most dangerous thing I hear bankers tell founders is, “Don’t worry about the buyer set, we will run a broad process and let the market decide.” Well, the market does decide. And today that market is mostly private equity, with three out of four buyers running the same underwriting math. The founder’s preparation determines what each segment will pay. Without a buyer in mind, the discount lever falls wherever it lands.

None of this guarantees a bad outcome. A founder can prepare the standard way, and the right buyer can still walk in the door. That is luck. When the asset in question represents 90% of a founder’s net worth, luck is not a strategy. Once the process starts, you cannot go back.

WHAT THIS MEANS FOR 2026

Most founders still think they are negotiating against a competitor. In many industries, they are negotiating against an underwriting model.

For a founder running a $10-million to $50-million-revenue business, the first question is not what the business is worth. It is who is going to be in the room. If you cannot name the three most likely buyers, by category and by lane, you are not prepared to start negotiations

Most founders built their businesses through trial and error, learning by failing and trying again That is exactly the instinct that made them successful.

Selling is the chapter that does not allow a second attempt. By the time the founder realizes the buyer is different than expected, momentum has made the preparation decisions irreversible. There is no version two of an exit.

The market has changed. The work of selling needs to change with it.

Ron Smith is founder and editor-in-chief of the Cordis Institute.