Skip to content
Fast Company Executive Board

The Fast Company Executive Board is a private, fee-based network of influential leaders, experts, executives, and entrepreneurs who share their insights with our audience.

Why security companies cannot simply block all ransomware

You will never catch every threat, so plan for failure, not perfection.

[Photo: Getty Images]

Profile photo of Elisha Riedlinger

Chief Operator Officer · NeuShield

Every time a major ransomware attack makes headlines, the same question surfaces. If security companies are so advanced, why do these attacks keep working? Why don’t they just block all ransomware?

It sounds reasonable. Organizations spend millions on security tools. Vendors promise prevention, detection, and response. Boards assume that with enough layers, attacks should be stopped before damage occurs. Yet ransomware continues to slip through. The uncomfortable truth is that security vendors aren’t just lazy or incompetent. It is that the problem itself is far harder than most people realize.

To block an attack, you must first know what an attack looks like. That is where the real challenge begins.

DETECTION IS THE CORE PROBLEM

Every security product relies on detection. Whether it is antivirus, endpoint detection and response, network monitoring, or email filtering, the product must decide whether something is good or bad. That decision is never perfect.

Security tools learn from history. They use known malicious code, known attack behaviors, and known indicators as a baseline for bad. They also rely on known applications, trusted publishers, and common usage patterns as a baseline for good. This approach works well for yesterday’s threats. It struggles with tomorrow’s.

Ransomware authors understand this better than anyone. They constantly modify their tools, techniques, and delivery methods. A small change can make an attack look brand new. From the security product’s perspective, it has never been seen before.

When something has never been seen before, the product must guess. Is this new behavior malicious or benign? That guess determines everything.

THE FALSE POSITIVE DILEMMA

If a security product leans too far toward caution, it treats the unknown as bad. That sounds appealing until it collides with reality. Modern environments are full of scripts, automation tools, drivers, updates, and custom applications. Blocking unfamiliar behavior often means blocking legitimate work.

This leads to false positives. Systems break. Applications fail. Users cannot do their jobs. Security teams get flooded with alerts. Eventually, exceptions are added. Whitelists grow. Alerts get ignored. The security posture weakens under its own weight.

Organizations quickly lose patience with tools that cry wolf. When everything looks like an attack, nothing does.

THE FALSE NEGATIVE TRAP

If the product leans the other way and treats the unknown as good, the environment becomes more usable. Fewer alerts. Fewer disruptions. But this comfort comes at a cost.

Unknown threats are allowed to run. New ransomware variants pass unnoticed. The attack does not trigger alarms until it is too late, often when files are already encrypted and backups are being targeted.

These misses are false negatives. They are quiet, dangerous, and far more damaging than false positives. Unfortunately, avoiding them entirely requires blocking far more than most organizations can tolerate.

THERE IS NO PERFECT BALANCE

Every security product lives somewhere between these two extremes. Lean too far toward blocking and you paralyze the business. Lean too far toward allowing and you invite disaster. There is no setting that eliminates both risks.

This is not a failure of technology. It is a fundamental limitation of detection-based security. The environment is constantly changing. Software updates weekly. New applications launch daily. Attackers innovate relentlessly. Security tools are always reacting.

THE MYTH OF ALLOW ONLY KNOWN GOOD

Some argue that the solution is simple. Allow only known good software and block everything else. In theory, this eliminates unknown threats entirely. In practice, it becomes a logistical nightmare.

Maintaining a complete catalog of all legitimate applications, libraries, drivers, scripts, and updates is daunting. Every patch changes a file hash. Every update introduces new components. Every business unit adopts new tools. The list never stops growing.

Keeping that catalog accurate requires constant maintenance, testing, and approvals. One missed update can halt operations. One forgotten script can break a critical process. What starts as a security strategy quickly becomes an operational burden.

This approach can work in tightly controlled environments with limited change. For most organizations, especially those that rely on modern software development and cloud services, it is nearly impossible to sustain.

WHY UPDATES PROVE THE POINT

If any security product could catch all threats, it would never need to be updated. The fact that every product requires constant updates tells a different story. Each update represents a lesson learned from a missed threat.

That missed threat might have hit someone else. Or it might have hit you.

Updates are not a sign of progress alone. They are evidence of past failures. They remind us that detection is always playing catch-up. Attackers only need to succeed once. Defenders must succeed every time.

This asymmetry defines the ransomware problem.

SHIFT THE CONVERSATION

The question should not be why security companies do not block all ransomware. The better question is why organizations still assume that blocking everything is possible.

Security remains essential. Reducing risk matters. Slowing attackers matters. Visibility matters. But prevention alone is not enough. It never has been.

Ransomware is not just a security problem. It is a data problem. When attackers succeed, the real damage comes from loss of access to data, prolonged downtime, and broken trust.

PLAN FOR FAILURE, NOT PERFECTION

Security will likely never catch all threats. Detection will always be imperfect. Unknown attacks will always exist. Pretending otherwise sets organizations up for catastrophic surprise.

This does not mean giving up. It means expanding the strategy. Data protection and recovery must be treated as a first-class citizen in the security stack. The ability to restore systems and data quickly and confidently is what turns a ransomware incident from an existential crisis into a survivable event.

Blocking ransomware is the goal. Surviving it is the requirement.

Elisha Riedlinger is COO at NeuShield.