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Your IT network has a Strait of Hormuz problem

Questions to ask to keep from getting stuck.

[Photo: Getty Images]

Profile photo of Sabina Anja

Chief Technologist

In February 2024, missiles fired from Yemen hit the Rubymar, a U.K.-owned commercial ship. The crew abandoned ship. As the vessel drifted across the Red Sea, its anchor dragged along the seabed, severing three main data cables connecting Europe and Asia. Initial estimates by HGC said about a quarter of Europe-Asia internet traffic was affected. RETN, an international network services provider, calculated traffic disruption was closer to 70% once congestion on surviving routes was counted. Because the cables sat in a war zone, repairs took months rather than weeks.

Many of the companies whose service was degraded that week had followed the standard resilience playbook: Buy network connectivity from two or three carriers so no single failure can take you offline. Yet one anchor took them all out.

Any energy executive would say such a situation was not only plausible, but also predictable. About 20% of the world’s petroleum moved through the Strait of Hormuz in 2024. The industry has built a whole way of working around that chokepoint: Traders price risk, companies run scenarios, and governments hold reserves.

Corporate networks have chokepoints just as narrow. The difference is that almost no company checks whether its internet traffic depends on one.

THREE CONTRACTS, ONE SEABED

Carrier diversity protects you from problems with a single carrier, such as a failed router, a cut in metro fiber, or a maintenance window gone wrong. It does not protect you from geopolitical risk, because carriers do not own separate oceans. Nearly all intercontinental traffic travels over submarine cables. Carriers mostly buy capacity on the same cable systems. It gets complicated when competing carriers selling you “independent” circuits are all on the same cable.

These cables are also crowded into a few corridors. Between Europe and Asia, essentially one corridor exists. By CSIS’s analysis, about 17% of global internet traffic, and more than 90% of data communications between Europe and Asia, pass through Egypt and the Red Sea. This includes the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which is just 16 miles wide at its narrowest point.

If you buy three carriers from Frankfurt to Singapore, all three circuits will likely run within a few miles of one another for at least 1,000 miles. Nothing in the contracts will tell you that. Your account manager may not know it either, since circuits are assigned to cables by capacity planners who often reassign them as economics shift.

THE CORRIDOR THAT KEEPS FAILING

The Rubymar incident was not a one-off. In September 2025, two more systems in the same corridor, SMW4 and IMEWE, were disrupted, and Microsoft told Azure customers to expect “higher latency” on some traffic that previously traversed the Middle East. Microsoft has more physical route diversity than any enterprise will ever buy, and its best move was still to send traffic the long way around and pass the delay to customers. Your carriers respond the same way, with fewer options.

Other regions show the same pattern. Baltic telecom and power cables were repeatedly damaged in late 2024 and 2025 in incidents that European governments investigated as possible sabotage. Taiwan has also recorded a series of suspicious cuts on the cables connecting it to the rest of the world. Cables have always broken. Some 200 faults occur annually, mostly from fishing gear and anchors. The industry usually repairs them without anyone noticing.

What has changed is that breaks now cluster in politically contested waters, where repair ships must wait for permits and safe passage, causing major degradation for clients and overloading surviving routes. Ironically, that is exactly what carrier diversity was meant to prevent.

WHY NOBODY CHECKS

If the physical routes matter this much, why do so few companies verify them before contracting with carriers? There are three reasons, and none is incompetence. Procurement compares carriers on price, capacity, and Service Level Agreement (SLA) terms. Physical routing locations are not included.

Customers need to request that information separately, usually under non-disclosure agreements and delivered as route maps. Few buyers ask because the request-for-proposal template doesn’t ask. The SLA also creates false confidence: Credits for missed availability are capped at a fraction of the monthly circuit fee, a rounding error against weeks of bad connectivity, and certainly a credit doesn’t result in rerouted traffic. Even a verified answer can go stale because carriers routinely move circuits between cable systems in a process called re-grooming. The diverse paths you confirmed at signing can converge a year later without notice.

Underneath all that sits an ownership gap. The network team owns circuits. The risk function owns geopolitics. The overlap belongs to nobody until a corridor disruption makes the news and management starts asking how it happened.

PROCUREMENT AND TECHNICAL QUESTIONS TO ASK

The first step is to ask each carrier, under NDA, for the physical route of every critical circuit, down to cable systems and landing stations. The next step is to make diversity contractual: Name the corridors or cable systems that must remain distinct, require notice when circuits are re-groomed, and re-verify on a schedule. Remember, a route confirmed two years ago only tells you where your traffic used to go.

Now ask the same questions of the services you never bought circuits for. That’s because exposure also travels through your cloud regions, Software-as-a-Service vendors, and partners’ networks. Azure customers learned about their dependence on the Red Sea from a status page. Learn to plan for degradation rather than a full blackout, since the 2024 and 2025 events mostly added latency instead of cutting anyone off completely. Voice, trading, and real-time collaboration start failing by an extra 100 to 150 milliseconds, while email usually carries on fine. Knowing which systems fall into which category should help you prepare.

The oil industry learned its chokepoint discipline through 50 years of supply shocks. For information technology networks, the learning came through companies that spent 2024 and 2025 discovering where their traffic went. To find out whether you may be next, ask whether anyone in your organization can name the cables your international traffic rides. If nobody can, expect choppy seas.

Sabina Anja is a chief technologist, executive advisor, and open-source entrepreneur.